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Abstract
The UK, with its relatively liberal immigration policies following recent enlarge-
ments, has been one of the main recipients of migrants from new EU member states.
This paper poses the questions: what is the e®ect of immigration on a receiving econ-
omy such as the UK? Is the e®ect bene¯cial or adverse for growth? How di®erently
would skilled (or unskilled) migration a®ect both receiving and sending economies?
What factors would contribute to immigration/emigration bene¯ts/costs and eco-
nomic growth driven by migration? Who are the winners and losers in both the
sending and host regions? We utilize an endogenous growth two-bloc model with
labour mobility of di®erent skill compositions to address these questions. We show
that migration, in general, is bene¯cial to the receiving country and increases the
world growth rate. With remittances, the sending country in aggregate can also ben-
e¯t. The only exception is in the case of unskilled migration, which can actually have
a detrimental impact on the world growth rate. Winners are migrants, and the skill
group in the region that sees its relative size decrease.
JEL Classi¯cation: F22, F43, J24, J61, O41
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6 Conclusions and Policy Implications 181 Introduction
Labour mobility is one of the most important and controversial issues in contemporary
economic and political debates. In the lead-up to the recent general election in the UK,
it appears that migration has been perceived as a burden for the indigenous population,
resulting in less liberal migration policies proposed by all the major political parties. It
is clear that the post-enlargement migration in the European Union, as well as migration
from outside the EU15, has raised the UK population since the beginning of the 1990s.
Since the onset of the economic crises, immigration has declined, but still over 14% of the
working age in the UK were born abroad.1 The UK economy, with its relatively liberal
immigration policies following the two most recent enlargements, has been one of the
main recipients from the new EU countries. Does this make the UK economy stronger or
weaker? What are the economic bene¯ts/costs associated with migration? The answers
to these questions clearly have major implications not only for the UK, but also for the
migrants' countries of origin. The overall balance is likely to have an impact ¯rst on the
natives' attitude towards migration, and second on future immigration policies at home
and in the sending economies.
In general, it is argued that in°ows of migrants can have an impact on the host coun-
try's labour market as well as on the welfare and pension systems, e®ects that can be
either bene¯cial or negative. However, the ¯scal burden of migration, the impact on un-
employment and arguments related to migrants' labour mobility, whilst important, are
not covered here. Our focus in this paper is on the dynamic long-run growth implications
of migration for both the UK and the EU. We examine migration of di®erent compositions
and identify both aggregate e®ects and the bene¯ciaries and losers.2
We then must start with the following question: who is the typical immigrant to
the UK and the EU from within and from countries outside the EU? Immigrants' skill
composition plays a fundamental role in our analysis and for this reason migration trends
by skill group are examined in some detail in section 2. The rest of the paper is then
organized as follows. Section 3 presents our theoretical framework in which we describe
1See Wadsworth (2010).
2See Barrell et al. (2007) for an earlier analysis of the impact of EU enlargement on various macroeco-
nomic variables in, both, sending and receiving countries
1an endogenous growth two-bloc model with labour mobility of di®erent skill compositions.
Section 4 then reports simulation results based on this model. Section 5 reviews related
empirical evidence of the economic impact of migration and its skill composition. Finally
we conclude and discuss some policy implications in section 6.
2 Migration Trends
The purpose of this section is to assess both the aggregate °ows and the skill composition
of migration into the UK and the EU from the early 1990's.
2.1 Total and Net Migration for the UK
Our ¯gures are obtained from the O±ce for National Statistics for all International Migra-
tion estimates, which are mainly based on the International Passenger Survey. Although
these are the o±cial estimates for the UK, it only considers long-term migration (these
intending to stay/leave for more than one year on arrival departure) so will miss many A8
migrants.3
The number of immigrants in the UK has doubled up between 1992 and 2009. Figure
1 shows that over 500,000 migrants are estimated to have arrived each year since 2004.
This compares with a ¯gure of less than 300,000 in 1992, gradually increasing for a decade
since then. The ¯gure jumped up to 586,000 in 2004, (the year of major EU enlargement)
and reached the highest ¯gure on record, 596,000 in 2006, followed by the second highest
¯gure, 590,000 in 2008, of which 86% were non-British citizens.
The estimated number of people leaving the UK was just less than 300,000 in the early
1990s, similar to the number of immigrants. This trend was maintained until 1997 and
since then, the number of emigrants has increased by over 100,000 to 400,000 in 2006 and
to 427,000, the highest ¯gure on record, in 2008. This is compared with 340,000 in 2007.
The rise in 2008, the year the UK was hit by the worldwide ¯nancial crisis, was a result
of a large (about 50%) increase in emigration of non-British citizens, especially returning
A8 migrants.
3See Drinkwater and Clark (2008) for more details and issues arising from the inadequacy of migration
data.
2Net migration, measured by the di®erence between these in°ows and out°ows, was
around 50,000 until 1997 and increased to 244,000, the record highest in 2004 and slightly
decreased in 2005 and 2006, picking up again to 237,000 in 2007. The ¯gure then decreased
to 163,000 in 2008. Despite this increase in net immigration it should be pointed out that
the share of immigration stock in total population (10.7% in 2007) is lower in the UK than
other OECD countries such as Canada (20.1%), Sweden (13.4%), and Germany (13%).4
2.2 Skill Composition of All Immigrants in the UK
Immigrants in the UK have, on average, longer educational attainment than UK-born
workers and more recent immigrants appear to be more educated than existing immi-
grants.5 Figure 2 shows that as total immigrants rise, the number of immigrants with
every usual occupation prior to migration has increased since 1991. From this ¯gure, the
biggest occupational category of immigrants to the UK have been the professional and
managerial group. By contrast, the absolute number of immigrants with \other adults",
consisting of adult dependents and adults with no job prior to migration, has been fairly
steady.
Turning to occupational shares in Figure 3, the proportion of other adults to total
migration in°ow has gradually decreased over time from over 20% in 1992 to below 10%
in 2004. The share of immigrants with professional and managerial occupation has been
around or over 30% of total immigrants for all years since 1991. The share of immigrants
with manual and clerical occupation has gradually increased from under 20% in 1991 to
above 25% in 2005 with the help of a speedy increase in its absolute number since year
1997, 50,000 in 1997 to 150,000 in 2005. This °ow recently started decreasing to 126,000
in 2008. Similar to manual occupations but more dramatically, the number and the share
of immigrants, who were students prior to immigrating to the UK (and would possibly
become students again, employed or unemployed), both have increased from 50,000 (17%)
in 1992 to 175,000 (30%) in 2006. Such a trend of skill biased immigrants to the UK is
comparable with that of unskilled biased migrants to the US.6
However, looking at the post-migration occupational distribution of immigrants com-
4See OECD (2009).
5See Wadsworth (2010)
6See Dustmann et al. (2005)
3pared to UK-born labour force, one can ¯nd a pattern which is somewhat di®erent from
their occupational distribution prior to migration.7 As discussed in Wadsworth (2010),
despite the high quali¯cation of immigrants respect to average UK-born workers, they
mainly tend to work in less skilled jobs than might be expected given their previous job
experiences and quali¯cations. The important implication of this observation is that only
looking at immigrants' post-migration occupations may well be underestimating their skill
composition. This is particularly the case of A8 migrants.
In fact, from table 3 in Wadsworth (2010) that looks at the post-migration occupational
distribution of immigrants compared to UK-born labour force, one can ¯nd a pattern
which is somewhat di®erent from their occupational distribution prior to migration. It
appears that the largest proportion of immigrants were working in professional occupations
(16.5% of all immigrants). This is greater than the share of UK-born workers in the
same occupational group (13.1%) and marginally greater than a share of UK natives
in managerial occupations (16.4%). At the same time, almost 16% of all immigrants
worked in elementary occupations in 2009, which has sharply increased for new immigrants
(28.4%) and was much higher than the share of UK-born labour force serving in this
occupational group (about 10%). This indicates that there seems to be co-existence of
both skilled and unskilled bias of immigrants to the UK. It is in some sense not surprising
to see that post-migration occupational distribution of immigrants has changed following
the enlargements. Skill composition before was strongly a®ected by the point system so it
is not surprising to have a high proportion of high skilled immigrants before enlargements
and from countries outside the European Union.
2.3 Total and Net Migration in the EU
Figure 4 presents long-term trends of net migration of old EU15 members and new EU12
members. There was no signi¯cant change in net migration for both old and new EU
member countries until mid 1980s. Since then, the size of net migration for western EU15
countries has dramatically gone up from virtually zero in 1980-1984 to 2 million people in
2003, followed by a fall to about 1.6 million in 2005. In contrast, there was no noticeable
change in the ¯gure for new EU members.
7Figures 2 and 3 use pre-migration occupations.
4Looking at the share of foreign citizens in total population for individual EU15 coun-
tries in Figure 5, every old member country with an exception, Sweden, (from 5.5% to
5.3%) has experienced a rise in international migration stock in recent years 2000-2006.
Most dramatic increases are observed from Spain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, and the UK.
Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008) show that most people who \intend to move abroad" in
old EU15 countries were more likely to have relatively non-professional occupations. How-
ever, the share of potential emigrants with these occupations have clearly declined since
2002, and people with other professional, self-employed, general management occupations
have become more willing to move abroad.
2.4 Summary and Issues
The main trend observed here is that both immigration and net migration to the UK has
risen since 1993 and the net migration recently started to fall from 2007. Immigrants to
the UK are, on average, more educated than UK-born workers.8 Immigrants to the UK
with professional and managerial occupations prior to migration tend to take the largest
share of total immigrants. At the same time, the share of immigrants with manual and
clerical occupations has gradually increased, at least partly due to an increasing in°ow of
migrants employed in non-professional jobs from the new EU accession countries. This
means that the high proportion of skilled immigrants has been maintained by high in°ows
of relatively more professional workers from elsewhere such as other old EU members
and non-EU overseas countries. Like the UK, most of old EU member countries have
experienced a rise in international migration stock in recent years. People who intend to
move abroad from both the old EU15 and new EU10 countries were more likely to have
relatively non-professional but nevertheless skilled occupations.
Finally the post-migration distribution of immigrants' occupations is less skilled than
for pre-migration occupations with which overall there does not appear to be an unskill bias
for migration into the UK or the old EU15. This suggests that migrants tend to take less
skilled occupations than expected given their pre-migration occupations and quali¯cation
and that looking at the post-migration occupation may give a misleading estimate for skill
composition.
8See Wadsworth (2010)
53 Empirical Evidence
A vast number of studies have investigated the economic impacts of international migration
and a large proportion of this literature has focused on the e®ects of migration on economic
growth. The literature has extensively been reviewed in Borjas (1999), Card (2005),
Drinkwater et al. (2003) and Hanson (2008). Among these studies, Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1992) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) investigate the e®ect of migration on
economic growth and income convergence based on neo-classical models in which net-
migration would foster economic growth through faster convergence to a steady state
level of income per capita. They ¯nd that regional net-migration has positive e®ects on
growth in OLS regressions for the US and Japan (no statistically signi¯cant growth e®ect is
found for European countries) and the inclusion of the migration variable slightly increases
the estimate of beta-convergence. More relevant empirical studies have used the similar
convergence regression model but found no consensus on the e®ect of migration on growth
and convergence.9
Turning to the empirical evidence of the relationship between migration, skill composi-
tion of migrants, and economic growth, Winters (2001) suggests that if workers migrating
from a developing country to a developed county face a quarter of the wage gap between
the two economies, the liberalisation of the immigration quotas with a 5% increase in pop-
ulations of developed countries would bring about a global welfare gain of about $300bn
at 1997 prices. Similarly, Walmsley and Winters (2005) argue that developed countries'
lifting of immigration restrictions to both unskilled and skilled workers from developing
countries by 3% of the developed countries' labour force would yield a global welfare gain
of $150bn at 1997 prices. A much higher (more than four times greater) welfare gain from
the same liberalisation is estimated by World Bank (2006) using various estimated models,
concurring with our results below.
Rodrick (2004) estimates a positive gain of emigration for sending countries, among
various estimation results, such that liberalised labour mobility with a 3% increase in
developed countries labour forces which are supplied by temporary immigrants from de-
veloping countries for 3 to 5 years would stimulate the latter's annual welfare by $200bn.
9See Perssons (1997), Toya et al. (2004), Maza (2006), Kyrdar and Saracoulu (2008) and Buch and
Toubal (2009).
6World Bank (2006) reports that a lifting of immigration quotas by 3% of labour force in de-
veloped countries would deliver welfare gains to natives in both developing and developed
countries and new migrants in the latter, but this change would cause welfare loss for old
migrants in the latter. Walmsley et al. (2009), using a model of bilateral migration °ows,
¯nd that liberalisation of quotas on both unskilled and skilled workers from developing
economies by 3% of labour force in high-income countries would yield increases in the real
GDP of the developed economies which use the increased labour supply in production,
while in the spirit of our exercise in the previous section, gains of the developing countries
seem to depend on the magnitudes of remittances sent home and thus di®er across the
labour exporting developing economies.
Walmsley et al. (2009) also suggest that although the labour importing developed
countries would experience gains per migrant from both unskilled and skilled migration,
the gains from skilled migration is greater than that from unskilled migration. Again this
concurs with our results (see sections 4.2 and 4.3). Such increases in labour supply induced
by the lifting of the immigration quotas are found to reduce the wages of both unskilled
and skilled workers in the labour-importing developed economies by approximately 1.5%.
However, there is little econometric evidence that immigration to the UK has reduced
wages and employment for UK born workers in the UK (see Manacorda et al. (2007)). All
natives in both country groups would experience gains in terms of real GDP because the
increased migration brings about increased returns to capital and increased tax revenues
to the labour importing developed countries, while it raises wages and remittances from
abroad in the labour-exporting developing countries.
In the recent literature, it is found that since higher returns to education are expected
from skilled workers than unskilled workers, an increase in the skilled migration prospects
would foster human capital formation even from the sending countries' perspective. In
Beine et al. (2001) and Beine et al. (2008), for instance, it is found that when an economy is
open to migration, such increased migration opportunities particularly in economies with
low skilled emigration rates stimulate investment in education due to higher expected
returns to education and thus increase human capital stock. They also ¯nd that this
bene¯cial brain e®ect of migration dominates the drain e®ect owing to the emigration
of some workers. In contrast, Marchiori et al. (2009) show that for countries with high
7skilled emigration rates, the brain drain e®ect dominates the brain gain e®ect as reduced
skilled workers would hamper innovation activities or technology adaptation in the sending
country on top of the reduced capacity in domestic production.
4 A Theory of Growth, Migration and Skills
We ¯rstly need to model the process by which innovation and other economic processes
a®ect longer term rates of growth. This has been the subject of a burgeoning theoretical
and empirical literature in recent years. In contrast with the earlier neoclassical theory
as developed by Solow, which invoked exogenous technical change to explain sustained
growth, the focus of this new endogenous growth theory is on how the consumption and
savings decisions of households, the investment decisions of ¯rms and public policy de-
termine growth. Positive externalities from R&D expenditure and investment in physical
or human capital ¯gure prominently in this theory and indeed can provide the engine for
sustained growth, providing a potential role for government to raise growth by providing
subsidies to private investment, R&D, training and education.
The endogenous growth literature can usefully be divided into two broad strands. The
¯rst is closest to the Solow tradition and emphasizes capital accumulation as the engine of
growth, with capital broadly de¯ned to include human and physical components. In the
Solow model growth cannot be sustained in the long-run without the presence of exogenous
technical change because capital accumulation is accompanied by a fall in the marginal
product of capital. Income from investment and therefore savings also fall to a point where
the latter only replaces worn-out equipment and plant. The economy then only grows in
the long run if there is labour or capital augmenting technical change.
Various mechanisms have been suggested by which the tendency of the marginal prod-
uct to fall can be o®set, allowing investment to generate sustained growth. The introduc-
tion of human capital accumulation or capital externalities can in principle prevent the
marginal product of physical capital diminishing as the latter accumulates and long-run
growth emerges driven ultimately by the determinants of investment. The complete story
is not as straightforward as all this sounds: the contribution of the human and physical
capital externality must be su±cient to prevent growth petering out, but at the same
time these e®ects must not be excessive otherwise a balanced growth path is not achieved.
8Rather restrictive theoretical conditions are needed to ensure that this is so, which may
not hold true in the real world.
The model to be developed here draws upon a second broad strand of the literature
in which the discovery of new goods and processes provides the engine of growth. R&D
activity provides blueprints for these innovations and in turn require as inputs what Gross-
man and Helpman (1991) refer to as knowledge capital, by which they mean a body of
scienti¯c knowledge and techniques not speci¯c to any one production process. Knowledge
capital has two important characteristics that drive growth. First, it is a public good: it
is non-rival (ie one ¯rms consumption of knowledge does not reduce the amount available
to others) and it is non-excludable. Second, corresponding to the idea of learning by
doing in Arrow (1962), knowledge capital increases with the cumulative R&D experience
and therefore with the total stock of new goods in the economy. These two assumptions
regarding knowledge capital can be used to explain the idea of a capital externality in the
previous strand of growth theories. For the R&D strand of growth theory one question
remains: what drives R&D investment? Schumpeter (1942) argued that it is driven by
the expected pro¯tability of the new product re°ecting conditions in the relevant factor
and product markets that determines the amount invested in R&D and with it the pace
and direction of industrial innovation. Monopoly pro¯ts from the sale of new goods play
a central role, another Schumpeterian idea, and this departure from perfect competition
is a further feature that distinguishes the R&D led view of economic growth. Translated
into formal theory an investment in a new blueprint will be undertaken if the expected
net present value from the future stream of monopoly pro¯ts (taking into account the
possibility of losing the monopoly position through an erosion of patent rights) equals the
initial outlay on R&D. The resulting growth of the aggregate economy will depend on the
interaction between ¯rms producing distinctive goods and earning monopoly pro¯ts, the
same or di®erent ¯rms engaging in R&D activity to invent new blueprints and consumers
making savings and consumption decisions and supplying labour.
Globalisation of economies adds a further dimension to the theory of growth. Trade,
borrowing and lending in world ¯nancial markets and the international mobility of factors
of production can all contribute to growth on a world scale. Knowledge capital now
becomes a public good on an international scale. Every country can bene¯t from the
9emergence of new scienti¯c knowledge and techniques in any single country. Countries
that are best equipped to both absorb these spillovers as well as generate new ideas
themselves will outperform others.
It is necessary at this stage to distinguish between two products of R&D. The ¯rst we
have discussed and is described as knowledge capital. To recap, this is not speci¯c to any
particular new product but is a public good consisting of a stock of general scienti¯c and
technical ideas which will prove useful to the next generation of innovators. The second
product is a private good protected, albeit imperfectly, by patent laws and consists of a
blueprint for a new good or industrial process. Firms will undertake R&D if the expected
value of future monopoly pro¯ts exceeds the initial ¯xed costs.
By introducing migration into the picture, asymmetries between sending and host
regions now become a central feature. Following Parente and Prescott (2000) we assume
that both East and West have access to the same common technologies, but the ability of
¯rms to avail themselves of the best technology di®er in the two blocs, leading to di®erent
total factor productivities (TFPs). Estimates from Hall and Jones (1999) suggest that
TFP levels are far lower in the new EU10 than the old EU15. Since our focus is on long-
run growth, the question arises as to whether large TFP di®erences will persist for long in
the transitional economies. Estimates of TFP growth and labour productivity for Eastern
and Western Germany in the 1990s from Burda and Hunt (2001) show that in the ¯rst half
of the decade convergence was rapid, but in the second half it slowed down considerably
leaving Eastern labour productivity almost frozen at around two-thirds of that in the West.
This suggests that in the transitional economies we may expect some rapid convergence
at ¯rst, but that some signi¯cant East-West TFP productivity di®erence will persist for
some considerable time. This is what we assume in the model we set out below. The
remaining di®erences between East and West are the factor endowments of skilled and
unskilled labour and initial capital which are both higher in the West.
The questions that remain are: given that there may well be a skill-bias if anything,
what is the e®ect of immigration on receiving economies in the West such as the UK? Is
the e®ect bene¯cial or adverse for growth? Does emigration have brain drain e®ects on
sending economies? How di®erently would skilled (or unskilled) migration a®ect both re-
ceiving and sending economies? What factors would contribute to immigration/emigration
10bene¯ts/costs and economic growth driven by migration? Who are the winners and losers
in both the sending and host regions?
4.1 The Model
To answer these questions, we use a formal endogenous growth two-bloc model, based on
the work of Currie et al. (1999), Chui et al. (2001) and Levine et al. (2010) which in turn
builds on the work of Grossman and Helpman (1991). The model has two blocs, \East"
and \West" with the following features in each bloc:
² There are three factors of production: skilled labour, unskilled labour and physical
capital.
² In the absence of specialization there are four sectors: a high-technology manufac-
turing sector producing an expanding variety of di®erentiated goods; a traditional
traded sector producing a single traded homogeneous good (e.g., food, steel); a tra-
ditional non-traded sector produces another homogeneous good (e.g., construction,
services) and an R&D innovative sector producing blueprints for new manufactured
goods.
² As well as producing blueprints for new goods, R&D generates knowledge capital
which is a public good within and between the two regions.
² The ranking of unskilled-skilled labour intensiveness is: traditional non-traded, tra-
ditional traded, manufacturing and R&D.
² The assumed market structures for outputs are competitive for the traditional and
R&D sectors and monopolistic for manufacturing.
² Labour markets are assumed to clear and there are no free public services.
² In the basic model there is no labour mobility between East and West and this is
subsequently compared with the case where migration between these blocs occurs.
² Migration of skilled workers from East to West reduces the size of the R&D and high
tech sectors in the East and increases it in the West. This is the sectoral reallocation
e®ect of migration. Potentially with a su±cient exodus of this category of workers
the East can be left with an economy specializing in low-tech activity.
11² Since TFP is higher in the West there is an e±ciency e®ect of East-West migration
from workers with any skill level and capital being more e®ectively employed.
A solution to the model constitutes a general equilibrium involving the interaction
of ¯nancial, product and labour markets. Using formal mathematical models such as
this has a number of advantages over simple descriptive analysis. Often mathematical
modelling con¯rms the initial intuition of more descriptive models and therefore provide
an invaluable check on the coherence of the argument. Sometimes formal models provides
surprises and further insights which either explain stylized facts or provide the basis for
empirical investigation.
4.2 The Immigration and Emigration Surpluses
The `immigration surplus' according to Borjas (1995) is the increase in income of the
indigenous population of the host country following immigration. The simplest model to
assess the magnitude of the immigration surplus is as follows. Consider two economies,
`East' and `West' where wages are perfectly °exible. Capital of both the physical and
human variety are ¯xed and higher in the West. Both average and marginal output per
worker is therefore higher in the West. In addition, following the recent literature on
income di®erences between countries10 we assume that total factor productivity is higher
in the West, which creates a further outward shift in the Western marginal product of
labor curve relative to the East.
Figure 6 shows what happens when migration from East to West occurs. The Eastern
workforce (fully employed by assumption) falls from OA by an amount HA increasing the
Western workforce by the same amount AB=HA. The area under the marginal product
of labor (MPL) curves give total output and the MPL(West) is higher than its Eastern
counterpart MPL(East) because physical and human capital is higher in the West. Ignore
for the moment human capital di®erences; then 1 unit of Eastern labor is equivalent to
1 unit of Western labor. Output then rises by an amount KDBA in the West and falls
by an amount FJAH=ECBA in the East. The net increase in world output is therefore
given by the region KDCE. The real wage falls in the West and rises in the East. If there
are costs associated with migration and migrants maximize income net of costs, migration
10See, for example, Parente and Prescott (2000).
12will cease before wages are equalized. Figure 1 shows the case of factor price equalization
where migration costs are zero and migration leads to equal wage rates. Migrants gain by
an amount EDCJ; non-migrants in the East see total output fall by an amount FJG. The
original Western population gains by the shaded amount KDE { the immigration surplus.
This constitutes a total gain of wWKDw for Western capital and a loss of wWKEw for
Western workers. Similarly the non-migrants in the East lose by an amount FGJ = EJC;
wFGwE is a gain for Eastern workers and wFJwE is a loss for Eastern capitalists. Thus
the losers are the original Western workers and Eastern capitalists; the winners are the
migrants and Western capitalists.
This simple analysis does not di®erentiate between di®erent types of labour but Borjas
(1995) does go onto discuss the importance of the skill composition of immigrants. This is
because the skill level of immigrants will determine the degree to which immigrants will be
competing with natives for jobs and hence what impact they will have on their wages as well
establishing the relationship between these di®erent skill groups and capital. Borjas (1995)
suggests that as the complementarity of skilled labor and capital rises Hamermesh (1993),
the immigration surplus can increase substantially if immigration consists mainly of skilled
workers, although this will depend on the original mix of unskilled and skilled workers in
the population. Therefore, the key issue to establish is whether immigrants and natives
are substitutes or complements in the production process and as a result, a relatively large
literature has emerged on estimating the extent of the substitutability/complementarity
between native and immigrant workers.11
The welfare gain (or loss) in the East, the Emigration Surplus and the World Surplus
are assessed in a similar fashion. In the numerical results that both are measured in
utility terms as the percentage equivalent permanent consumption change relative to the
balanced-growth steady state.
5 Simulation Results
The properties of the general equilibrium solution obtained numerically and the calibration
used are set out in detail in Levine et al. (2010). Here we provide a summary of the main
¯ndings.
11See Borjas (1999) for a summary of early studies.
13The impact of migration in the host and in the receiving country is a result of coun-
teracting forces. Some authors focus on the impact on wages and on labour market con-
ditions in general as in Borjas (1995). Others, such as Lundborg and Segerstrom (2002)
and Lundborg and Segerstrom (2000) look at the negative impact on the asset value
of equity issued to ¯nance R&D. In our general equilibrium framework the factors that
contribute to the immigration/emigration surplus/de¯cit are: technological complemen-
tarities, terms of trade, change in asset prices, e±ciency and sectoral reallocation e®ects.
The static and dynamic e®ects often have a counteracting impact on economic welfare at
home and abroad.
We consider the case where the East is relatively less endowed with skilled labour
and total factor productivity (TFP) is lower in the East. With this particular pattern
of skill-labour endowments and TFP in the two regions, we examine the e®ect of East-
West migration with di®erent skill compositions. Though all the e®ects are present in
our simulations, by concentrating on migration with and without skill bias keeping the
other parameters ¯xed, we focus our analysis on the e±ciency and the sectoral reallocation
e®ects of international migration highlighted above.
5.1 Migration with no Skill Bias
Figure 7 shows the e®ect of a 10% increase in the Western population from immigration
with no skill bias in its composition. An increase in growth now occurs of 0.25% which is
almost entirely the result of a movement of workers from a country with a low TFP to one
with a high TFP (the e±ciency e®ect). All sectors in the West grow as they absorb the
immigrant workers. The transfer of workers from a less to a more e±cient R&D sector sees
the Western share of new products rise and world growth rises. The consequent increase in
demand for high skill labour causes the relative skill-unskilled wage in both blocs to rise.
There is a small rise in the Western R&D share and a small decrease in the corresponding
share in the East.
The e®ect of these changes on welfare is summarised in panels (b) to (e) of ¯gure 7.
Figure 7(e) shows the world surplus worked out as the equivalent percentage permanent
change in consumption for a representative household consisting of skilled and unskilled
workers, in the East and in the West, weighted according to post-migration proportions.
14The maximum world surplus is around 9% when migration reaches 10% of the Western
workforce. This breaks down into 1% for Western skilled workers, about 0.5% for native
unskilled workers, giving an immigration surplus of around 0.85% for the representative
Western native household (¯gure 7b). For those remaining in the East skilled workers
gain by over 0.75%, unskilled workers lose by -1.35% giving an emigration de¯cit for
the representative Eastern non-migrant of about -1.2% (¯gure 7c). Finally ¯gure 7(d)
shows that the representative migrant gains by a substantial 200%. In summary, with
our parameter values, the positive e±ciency e®ect comes to dominate the potential static
negative e®ects highlighted in the literature. Winners in order of the size of gain are
migrants, overwhelmingly, followed by skilled workers in the West, unskilled workers in
the West and skilled workers in the East. The only losers are unskilled workers in the
East.
5.2 Migration with Skill Bias
We now show the impact in our model of a 10% in the Western population from immi-
gration with skill bias. A change in the composition of labour will have an impact on the
way resources are allocated between the di®erent sectors (sectoral reallocation e®ect) with
a positive or negative impact on growth depending on the type of migration we are con-
sidering. In this framework with biased migration, the manufacturing and R&D sectors
play an important role. Our next set of simulations in ¯gure 8 looks at the e®ect of a 10%
increase in the Western population consisting of skilled workers. Now there are substantial
reallocation e®ects in both blocs, towards high-tech activity in the West and the opposite
in the East, arising from the changes in the proportions of skilled to unskilled workers.
Indeed skilled migration of over 5% of the West workforce sees the R&D and high-tech
sectors disappear altogether in the East.
Taken together with the e±ciency e®ect of a movement from a less to a more e±cient
economy, growth now rises by over 0.5% (¯gure 8a). The world surplus now rises to 11%
(¯gure 8e). The immigration surplus is almost 12% for unskilled natives, -2.5% for skilled
natives averaging at almost 6 % (¯gure 8b). The emigration surplus is 17% for skilled, -50%
for unskilled averaging at -10% (¯gure 8c), but both skilled and unskilled migrants gain
substantially again (¯gure 8d). Winners, again in order of gain, are migrants, unskilled
15workers in the West and skilled workers in the East. The losers are skilled workers in the
West and unskilled workers in the East. So the distributional e®ect of skilled migration is
to reduce inequality in the West, but do the opposite in the East.
5.3 Unskilled Migration
We now look at the impact of a 10% increase in the Western population consisting of
unskilled migration. This seems to be the least relevant case according to our assessment
of migration trends in section 2. Unskilled migration now has a negative impact on the
world growth rate.12 From Figure 9, in comparison with skilled migration, now we have a
opposite symmetrical sectoral reallocation e®ect owing to a change in the opposite direction
of the proportion of skilled and unskilled workers in the West, but there is still a positive
e±ciency e®ect due to a movement of workers from a country with a low TFP to one with
a high TFP. The world surplus is now a modest 0.4%. The emigration surplus is 13% for
unskilled and -12% for skilled while the immigration surplus is 5% for skilled natives and
-16% for unskilled natives. Winners, once again in order of gain, are migrants, unskilled
workers in the East and skilled workers in the West. The losers are unskilled workers in
the West and skilled workers in the East. So now the distributional e®ect of unskilled
migration is to increase inequality in the West, but do the opposite in the East.
5.4 Summary
The main result that emerges is that while unskilled migration decreases growth, migra-
tion of no-skill bias and skilled migration from a low to a high TFP region of the world
increases growth, but in the absence of some distribution mechanism there are winners
and losers, with remaining non-migrants in the latter category. The reason is that the
East sees a reduction in its share of high tech goods which involve a price mark-up over
marginal cost, and the relative wage of the unskilled workers fall. Distributional e®ects
are summarized in Table 1.
12In Drinkwater et al. (2007) we also investigate the impact of migration on the immigration surplus for
di®erent degree of complementarities and we show that when skilled labour and capital are complements
changes in asset prices can have a signi¯cant e®ect and that the complementarity worsens the impact of
unskilled migration.
16Migration Group No Bias Skilled Bias Unskilled Bias
Migrant Winners Winners Winners
Western Skilled Winners Losers Winners
Western Unskilled Winners Winners Losers
Eastern Skilled Winners Winners Losers
Eastern Unskilled Losers Losers Winners
Table 1. Winners and Losers from Migration.
One possible distribution mechanism is through remittances from migrants to their fami-
lies remaining in the East. In Levine et al. (2010) we examine the e®ects of skilled migrants
remitting a given percentage of their income ranging between 0% and 50%. Assuming that
families are either entirely skilled or unskilled, these remittances will end up in the pocket
of skilled households in the East. This group were winners in the absence of remittances so
remittances in themselves do not mitigate the distributional e®ects of migration. However
if we assume that intra-country distributional mechanisms exist, or that households are
of a mixed skilled type, then we can focus on the representative household in both blocs.
Then we can show that at any remittance rate above around 35%, migrants remain sub-
stantial winners, and the Eastern representative household begins to emerge as a winner.
These welfare e®ects with remittances are summarized in Table 2.
Type of Migration Growth E®ect (%) IS (%) ES (%)
Unbiased 0.3 0.85 -1.2
Skilled 0.5 5.5 -8.0
Skilled with 50% remittances 0.5 5.5 7
Unskilled -0.35 -0.05 -6
Table 2. Growth, Immigration Surplus (IS), Emigration Surplus (ES) of Rep-
resentative Households.
176 Conclusions and Policy Implications
In this section we summarize our results and attempt to formulate their policy implica-
tions. The East-West European migration that followed the 2004 and 2007 enlargements
has created one of the most interesting migration-policy `laboratories' in the world. In
light of the main results that emerge in section 5 it is useful to summarize the nature of
European migration °ows since World War II. Periods of labour shortages such as in the
1960's induced active recruitment policies in some European countries. This openness was
followed by a period of restrained migration. Since the fall of the Berlin wall, all CEECs
now grant their citizens the right to migrate and from that time East-West migration
started to gain particular attention. However some EU countries still maintained barriers
to immigration. Following recent enlargements, much East to West migration was antic-
ipated. The UK did not initially impose any transitional restrictions on labour mobility
and has clearly experienced an increase in the number of immigrants, particularly from the
East. A well-known result of the migration literature, namely the prediction that bene¯ts
and losses from integration will be distributed unevenly among the individual factors of
production, deserves special attention.
In a static economic analysis of labour markets, migration could decrease wages or
the probability to be employed of workers who directly compete with immigrants. In our
general equilibrium framework we look at the overall picture and we focus on the dynamic
long-run aspect of migration. Section 5 shows that migration, in general, is bene¯cial to
the receiving country and increases the world growth rate. The only exception is in the case
of unskilled migration which can actually have a detrimental impact on the world growth
rate. This possibility however seems to be unlikely from our examination of migration
trends in section 2 which suggests that if anything, the skill composition of immigrants is
biased towards skilled workers.13
The debate which has focused on the role of institutions and governments as mecha-
nisms that can regulate migration and its composition as well as mitigate the potential
negative impact of immigration on the receiving countries, poses many controversial ques-
tions. Here we focus on an aspect that can capture them all: what are the dynamic
consequences of migration in the host and in the sending economy? To summarize the
13This is supported by the analysis in Wadsworth (2010).
18main result of our theoretical framework, the dynamic aspect magni¯es the role of high
skilled migration. Depending on the skill group, some workers in the East and West lose
even if overall the receiving and the sending economies gain.
How does this translate in terms of policy recommendations? First of all, given the po-
tential bene¯ts of migration for the long-term growth rate, especially if migrants are high
skilled, an overly restrictive migration policy may constrain the overall growth in both re-
gions. However our analysis gives strong support to policies supported by all mainstream
parties in the UK to restrict immigration from non-EU countries to skilled workers. Sec-
ond, whether the resulting immigration and emigration surpluses are signi¯cant or not,
winners and losers remain and this suggests that compensating redistributive policies can
mitigate the distributional e®ect of migration. We have examined one such mechanism -
remittances - but clearly there is a role for policy that as well as encouraging these °ows,
needs to ensure that overall economic gains are more equally distributed through mea-
sures using the tax system, welfare-to-work and the provision of public services. Finally,
our analysis points out to a greater need to integrate immigrants in order to reduce the
gap between post-migration and pre-migration distribution of immigrants' occupations.
While part of this gap can be explained in terms of the temporary nature of migration,
particularly for A8 migrants, we believe there is a scope to improve migrants integration
(i.e language e®ective training, advice from employment services etc). We think that
migrants' skill depreciation due to limited integration can pose a severe limit to their
economic contribution and requires special attention.
Clearly, our investigation of the macroeconomic impact of migration is not exhaustive.
For example, we do not look at the impact of migration on unemployment. While short-
run e®ects on unemployment in the host country are not excluded, Ortega (2000) o®ers a
theoretical explanation of why immigration can be bene¯cial to the native worker, while
Borjas (2001) \greasing the wheels" argument 14 provides another optimistic view of the
labour market impact of migration in the host economy. The impact of migration can also
be analyzed from a di®erent perspective. For example, an important question concerns the
role that migrants can have in mitigating the ¯scal burden associated with the phenomenon
of an aging population. A strand of research, using a general equilibrium overlapping
14Immigration injects in the economy a group of highly mobile self-selected individuals, ready to move
to exploit economic opportunities in di®erent areas.
19generations framework, looks at the net ¯scal impact of migration. The answer to this is
in part related to the skill composition of the migrant (Ortega (2005), Cohen and Razin
(2009) and Cohen et al. (2009)).
Concerns over skilled migration have been raised by the literature on the \brain drain"
in the source economies. We have seen from a theoretical perspective that as high skilled
migrants that move to the country with a higher TFP, world growth increases, but re-
sults in a decrease in the size of the \modern" manufacturing and R&D sectors in the
sending economy. Although not formalized in our framework, migration can increase the
overall level of human capital in the source economy by increasing investment in human
capital (Beine et al. (2008)). Remittances, which in our model have only the function of
a redistributive devise, can provide important bene¯ts by increasing human and physical
capital investment. Clearly, di®erent policy recommendations in the sending economy are
dependant on whether it perceives either a brain drain or brain gain.
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Figure 1: Total Long-Term International Migration, UK
Source: Long-Term International Migration (LTIM) and International Passenger Survey
(IPS) from UKNS. Notes: Data rounded to thousands. The IPS is the main component of
these LTIM estimates. IPS estimates allow a more detailed analysis of the characteristics
of international migrants.
25￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
!
 
"
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
Figure 2: Migration In°ows by Occupation, UK (in 1,000)
Source: Long-Term International Migration (LTIM), International Passenger Survey
(IPS) from UKNS. Notes: Usual occupation prior to migration. Data rounded to thou-
sands.
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Figure 3: Migration In°ows by Occupation, UK (in %)
Source: Long-Term International Migration (LTIM), International Passenger Survey
(IPS) from UKNS. Notes: The ¯gure is measured by immigrants with that particular
occupation (usual occupation prior to migration) divided by total number of immigrants
that also include children as well.
27Figure 4: Net Migration in EU15, EU10 and EU2 (in 1,000)
Source: Figure 1 of Kahanec and Zimmermann (2008). Data are from Eurostat Popula-
tion Statistics (2006), Table F-1 p. 95 (till 2000), and Eurostat Yearbook (2008), Table
SP.22, p. 67 (from 2000 onwards). Notes: In 1,000 of persons. Net migration is esti-
mated as the di®erence between total population growth and natural increase. Annual
averages for the periods 1960-64 to 1995-99 are reported. For Cyprus starting from 1975
government controlled area only. 2000-2001: corrections due to census.
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Figure 5: International Migration Stock, Old EU15 (Foreign citizens in % of
total population)
Source: Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008) originally based on Eurostat.
29Figure 6: The Immigration Surplus with Homogeneous Labour
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Figure 7: No-Skill bias migration with Pre-Migration Labour
310 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03 0.035 0.04 0.045 0.05
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.7
6.8
SKILLED MIGRATION
 
%
 
G
R
O
W
T
H
(a) WORLD GROWTH
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03 0.035 0.04 0.045 0.05
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
SKILLED MIGRATION
I
M
M
I
G
R
A
T
I
O
N
 
S
U
R
P
L
U
S
Skilled Households
Representative Household
Unskilled Households
(b) IMMIGRA TION SURPLUS
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03 0.035 0.04 0.045 0.05
−60
−50
−40
−30
−20
−10
0
10
20
SKILLED MIGRATION
E
M
I
G
R
A
T
I
O
N
 
S
U
R
P
L
U
S
Skilled Households
Representative Household
Unskilled Households
(c) EMIGRA TION SURPLUS
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03 0.035 0.04 0.045 0.05
137.5
138
138.5
139
139.5
140
140.5
SKILLED MIGRATION
M
I
G
R
A
T
I
O
N
 
S
U
R
P
L
U
S
(
d
)
M
I
G
R
A
T
I
O
N
S
U
R
P
L
U
S
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03 0.035 0.04 0.045 0.05
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
SKILLED MIGRATION
W
O
R
L
D
 
S
U
R
P
L
U
S
(
e
)
W
O
R
L
D
S
U
R
P
L
U
S
Figure 8: High Skilled Migration with Pre-Migration Labour
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Figure 9: Low Skilled Migration with Pre-Migration Labour
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